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Few professions more clearly deserve the protection of the first
amendment than librarians. Yet few groups-perhaps none en-
gaged in sensitive intellectual activity-have gained fewer consti-
tutional safeguards. Decisions comparable to those defining the free
expression of professors, teachers, reporters, theatrical performers,
authors and others simply do not exist in the library field. As a
consequence, professional librarians understandably fear censor-
ship and repression-not only in "book burning" communities but
in more tranquil and civilized parts of the country as well.' There
are several reasons for this paucity of constitutional protection,
which we shall review shortly. There are also some persuasive, if
untested, legal bases for a new and much needed first amendment
freedom. The major concern of this article will be to explore these
intriguing constitutional issues.
The neglect of libraries and librarians as an object of constitu-
tional concern can be readily demonstrated. In his seminal treatise
on first amendment law,' Professor Thomas I. Emerson does not
mention libraries, though he develops at length the arguments for
a broad definition of free expression and inquiry. The relatively
few court cases dealing with libraries have concerned such collateral
matters as racial segregation or employment policies,' and not the
vital and sensitive central function for which libraries exist. In the
one instance where a federal appellate court has discussed library
circulation policies and access to controversial materials, the pres-
* A.B. 1956, A.M. 1957, LL.B. 1961, Harvard. Executive Vice President for
Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
'See, e.g., Library Parley Warns of Censorship, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1975,
at 16, col. 1-3.
2T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
3E.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); McConnell v. Anderson,
451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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ence of a substantial first amendment issue was all but overlooked.'
In the one pertinent state case, now pending in the California
courts, the profoundly important and delicate constitutional issue
has been avoided through artful statutory construction.' Thus the
constitutional rights and liberties of libraries and librarians remain
a virtually uncharted area of law-badly in need of attention, but
curiously neglected.
I. NEGLECT OF LIBRARIES IN THE LAW-
SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES
There are two possible explanations for the paucity of library
safeguards. One theory, of course, is that such protection does not
exist because it is not needed. This hypothesis deserves relatively
little attention, in light of the very major and persistent threats to
the freedom of libraries-threats reported bimonthly in the Ameri-
can Library Association's Newsletter on Intellectual Freedom and
recounted in larger perspective at the Association's annual meeting!
Few attacks on public school curricula or teaching materials fail to
include or at least invite attacks upon the school libraries as well.
Often the library is the first, rather than the last, object of repression
in a community determined to stamp out a particular book or
magazine, or all the works of a controversial author.' There should
be no need of elaborate refutation before we set the first hypothesis
to rest. We turn instead to a subtler and more complex, but ulti-
mately more satisfying explanation for the law's neglect of libraries
and librarians.
Librarians are perhaps in the worst possible position to press
their interests and assert their rights through the courts. On one
hand, they lack the massive economic stake that has generated most
first amendment test litigation; unlike movie distributors and ex-
hibitors, magazine and newspaper publishers, theatrical producers,
book publishers and others that have successfully asserted free
press or speech claims, librarians simply cannot finance test cases
as part of a commercial operation. Nor are they likely to be the
4 Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289 (2d Cir. 1972).
5 Moore v. Younger, No. 72-900-HP (C.D. Cal. 1972).
' See Library Parley Warns of Censorship, supra note 1.
"See generally D. BERNINGHAUSEN, THE FLIGHT FROM REASON: ESSAYS ON
INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM IN THE ACADEMY, THE PRESS AND THE LIBRARY (1975).
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beneficiaries of wealthy patrons, as in the case of the Oregon stu-
dent editor whose criminal appeal (for refusing to disclose a
source) was financed by the late Senator (and publisher) William
Knowland.8 Book publishers may support test litigation by dis-
tributors or authors,' but are far less likely to come to the aid of
beleaguered librarians.
On the other hand, librarians are remote from the legal services
programs that have enabled low income groups to assert their con-
stitutional rights through test suits. Most librarians, if underpaid,
are not indigent, and are thus well above the income levels for
public or private legal services. Even the national civil rights and
civil liberties groups have been relatively slow to respond to the
plight of the librarian. Thus, the librarian is too poor to afford
costly counsel or prolonged test litigation, yet not poor enough to
have the costs borne by others.
A second factor explaining the lack of precedent may be the
nature of the library profession. Unlike school teachers and other
groups that are increasingly well organized for economic and other
matters, librarians have been historically reluctant to press for re-
dress of grievances. When the American Library Association filed
an amicus curiae brief in the United States Supreme Court, seeking
a rehearing of the 1973 obscenity decisions, the New York Times
remarked editorially:
Professional librarians as a group are hardly known as flaming
radicals. As civil servants they find themselves in the delicate posi-
tion of being the guardians of much that is necessarily controversial,
while their place on the totem pole of Authority gives them very
little power to defend their professional opinions and their per-
sonal security."
The editorial concludes, with obvious approval, that ALA's plea
for a rehearing "represents an expert judgment based on experi-
ence at the firing line." Since that time the Association has filed at
least one other amicus brief in a major intellectual freedom case"
a State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968).
9 E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
"Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
"N.Y. Times, July 20, 1973, at 30, col. 1.
" Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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and has mounted a major test suit of its own. 3 But these are quite
recent developments, and are in some ways out of character for
librarians.
There are two other possible explanations for the paucity of
library litigation. One is the lack of clarity about the nature of the
librarian's constitutional claim. When a publisher is enjoined from
releasing (or a dealer from selling) a book, or a producer is barred
from presenting a play to a community, or a movie is seized from
the hands of a distributor, the issues are starkly clear. But when a
librarian is deterred from circulating a controversial volume, the
source of the pressure may be much harder to pin down. Moreover,
there appears to be a substantial amount of self-censorship by li-
brarians fearful of reprimands or reprisals; however reprehensible
may be the pressure that cause such behavior, they are beyond
challenge in the wake of voluntary compliance or even anticipa-
tion. 14
Such complexities as these led the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit several years ago to dismiss rather callously a li-
brarian's first amendment claim:
The administration of any library, whether it be a university or
particularly a public junior high school, involves a constant process
of selection and winnowing based not only on educational needs
but financial and architectural realities. To suggest that the shelv-
ing or unshelving of books presents a constitutional issue, partic-
ularly where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of
speech or thought, is a proposition we cannot accept."
The very issue, of course, is whether a "curtailment of freedom of
speech" may be shown where external pressures distort or thwart
professional judgment about circulation. But the fact that the pres-
sures are sometimes internal, even self-generated, and that many
other factors may impinge on that process, may deprive the li-
brarian's constitutional claim of the clarity that marks comparable
claims in other sectors.
It may also be less than clear how various laws affect the li-
brarian and his functions. In the current test suit brought by the
13 Moore v. Younger, supra note 5.
14 See Busha, Censorship and the Midwestern Public Librarian, 20 NEWS-
LETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 103 (1971).
"' Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, supra
note 4, at 293 (footnote omitted).
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American Library Association against the California "harmful to
minors" statute, the state attorney general has argued that librarians
need not fear prosecution because they neither "distribute" nor
"exhibit" anything that could be deemed harmful matter." This
is curious reasoning in two respects. For one, it is hard to see what
professional librarians do if it is not distribution or exhibition of
materials. Moreover, the attorney general himself had specifically
brought librarians within the ambit of the "harmful matter" law,
thus generating a quite reasonable apprehension of liability." Yet
the later attempt to confuse the issue by taking the librarian's func-
tion out of the statute simply illustrates the difficulty of framing
viable test cases.
Finally, one suspects that librarians are understandably reluctant
to identify themselves publicly in the way that a test case plaintiff
must do. Since most controversial volumes are suspect in the public
mind-whatever may be their literary merits-their advocacy may
entail certain risks. No one likes to be identified as a purveyor of
pornography, although if one makes his living by peddling dirty
books to susceptible customers at inflated prices, the risk is at least
a calculated one. Such a public posture for a librarian is even less
comfortable in the growing numbers of cases in which books are
attacked for allegedly biased treatment of issues of sex and race.
It is one thing to risk attack by the John Birch Society; it is quite
another to run afoul of the NAACP, CORE, NOW or WEAL. The
complexity of the pressures underlying book censorship, and the
risks of a strong public stand against those pressures, may have
deterred many potential plaintiffs from library test cases.
Whatever the cause of the current condition, the clear result has
been the underdevelopment of a major branch of the law of free
thought and expression. But is such a situation harmful, either to
librarians or to those with whom they deal? One might rely simply
upon the rapidly evolving first amendment law affecting other pro-
fessional groups, and hope to reason by analogy in the case of li-
brarians. Yet the needs and problems of librarians are quite differ-
ent from those of booksellers, publishers, newsdealers, theatrical
producers, professors and reporters. The whole process of deciding
whether to acquire and how to catalog and circulate a contro-
16 Moore v. Younger, supra note 5.
17 Id.
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versial work-not to mention the complex challenge of new non-
print formats-is simply different from the judgments required of
professionals in other fields.
These differences alone would call for development of a discrete
body of library law. The need to do so is underscored by the in-
creasing specialization of other branches of first amendment law.
Fifteen or twenty years ago there were simply free speech and free
press cases. Today we have relatively discrete bodies of law pro-
tecting the expression of students, teachers, reporters, publishers,
broadcasters, prisoners, and even rock musical producers. If the
librarian fails to seek comparably specialized redress from the
courts, the protection accorded other professionals may be prog-
ressively less helpful as it becomes more specialized. Thus it is no
longer simply a matter of librarians seeking generalized first amend-
ment protection; the critical need now is to develop a body of law
that meets the particular needs of a distinctive group.
Against this background, it is now time to consider the prospects
for the development of such a branch of first amendment law. We
begin with analogies simply because we have no holdings precisely
in point. The necessary starting point is the relationship between
the librarian and the patron, for if the prospective reader has a
constitutional right to read, it would appear that the librarian has
a constitutional right (if not responsibility) to serve that interest.
Apart from this derivative interest, it may be that the librarian's
own professional activity-selection, classification, shelving and
circulation of literary materials-warrants first amendment protec-
tion independent of the reader's interests. We will examine both
branches of the law.
II. THE RIGHT TO READ AS A SOURCE OF LIBRARIANS' LIBERTIES
One would naturally expect a clear judicial declaration of any
human interest as widely accepted as the right to read. Yet no such
declaration exists. From time to time the Supreme Court has ob-
served, always in dictum, that the first amendment "embraces the
right to distribute literature. . . and necessarily protects the right
to receive it."'" Yet the Court has always stopped short of a clear
18E.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); cf. Kleindeinst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969). See generally Comment, Freedom to Hear: A Political Justification of the
First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311 (1971).
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holding that the right to read (or to hear) controversial messages
enjoys the same constitutional protection as the right to dissemi-
nate. The best we can do is to reason by analogy from a number
of cases in which the receipt of information is at least implicated,
though never expressly protected.
First, there is a group of decisions involving the right to receive
publications. The case most closely in point is Lamont v. Post-
master General.1 In holding that Congress could not require postal
patrons to return address cards in order to receive mail from Com-
munist countries, the Court strongly implied that the first amend-
ment encompassed the receipt of controversial publications. Jus-
tices Brennan and Goldberg made the implication explicit in their
separate opinion:
[T]he protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific
guarantees to protect from constitutional abridgments those equally
fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express guar-
antees fully meaningful.... [T]he right to receive publications is
such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomp-
lish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive
and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that
had only sellers and no buyers."
Before reading this passage too broadly, several qualifications
are in order. This is only the view of two Justices, one of whom
has since left the Court. The Communist publications involved in
the Lamont case-unlike most objects of library controversy-
would have been unavailable anywhere else if the addressee could
not get them through the malls. Moreover, the detained publica-
tions bore the name of the individual addressees, and might be
thought (in contrast to library materials or bookstore displays) the
property of that addressee. Finally, Lamont does not say (even in
the concurring opinions) that there is a right to receive particular
materials in the mall, but only that Congress cannot require the pos-
tal patron to sign his name and reveal his identity as a condition of
receiving any mail from particular countries. The case would be
precisely on point if, for example, a public library required all
patrons wishing books about homosexuality, or Communism, or
explosives, to sign a special card which would then be circulated
19381 U.S. 301 (1965).
20 Id. at 308.
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throughout the system where anyone might see it. Such a practice
would almost certainly be struck down without deciding whether
the patron had a right of access to particular materials; a disclosure
requirement of this type would be an unconstitutional condition
even if there were no clear right to read.
A second group of cases deals with the right to hear a contro-
versial speaker. Several years ago the Supreme Court stopped short
of deciding the broad issue in the case involving Belgian Marxist
Ernest Mandel, who had been denied a visa and thus could not
accept speaking invitations in the United States. The Court dis-
missed Mandel's claims on the grounds that Congress had plenary
power to exclude aliens for virtually any reason, even though citi-
zens might wish to hear him speak.' In the course of the opinion,
however, the Court strongly implied a constitutional interest on the
part of potential citizen audiences. The majority rejected the gov-
ernment's claim that persons who wished to receive Mandel's mes-
sage could buy his books, read his articles, or even listen to record-
ings of his speeches outside the United States. "This argument,"
replied Mr. Justice Blackmun, "overlooks what may be particular
qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and
questioning."' Justice Marshall, in dissent, insisted that "the right
to speak and hear-including the right to inform others and to be
informed about public issues-are inextricably part of that pro-
cess."
Earlier cases involving college and university speaker bans also
imply a right to hear. In most cases of the late 1960's and early
'70's, the speaker was among the plaintiffs, so the rights of the
audience never came into issue.'M In one case, however, the speaker
had dropped out of the suit. The court nonetheless went on to
strike down the speaker ban at the behest of the prospective listen-
ers: "[T]here is respectable authority indicating that the audience,
which is, after all, a principal beneficiary of the First Amendment,
1 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
Id. at 765.
2Id. at 775.
24E.g., Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v.
University of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Dickson v. Sitter-
son, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See generally Van Alstyne, Political
Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA.
L. REV. 328 (1963).
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also has standing to seek relief against illegal censorship .... There
is a First Amendment right to peacefully assemble to listen to the
speaker of one's choice, which may not be impaired by state legis-
lation any more than the right of the speaker may be impaired."'
In the speaker ban cases, as with Lamont, several cautions are
appropriate. The constitutional barrier has usually been only one of
standing, with the disposition of the merits fairly clear if the court
could reach them. Moreover, there are obvious differences between
the speaker-audience relationship and the reader-author or reader-
publisher relationship. Without an audience, there literally is no
speech and no way in which the speaker can exercise his undoubted
first amendment right. Also, the close concurrence between listen-
er's and speaker's interests suggests a particular urgency here that
may not be present in the reader-publisher or reader-writer con-
text, where distinctive interests exist and can be independently
recognized by the courts. Thus the analogical value of the speaker
cases, though substantial, must be qualified.
Some additional support may come from recent decisions in-
volving broadcast licensing and the "public interest." In sustaining
the "personal attack" rules promulgated by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, the Supreme Court identified a strong lis-
tener-viewer first amendment interest in the receipt of balanced
material: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters," observed the unanimous Court, "which is
paramount."" The Court spoke also of the "right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences" as an interest of a high constitutional
order." Several years later, while holding that a particular group
had no constitutional right to present its message on the air, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the primacy of the listener-viewer inter-
est in receiving information over the air. 8 Perhaps even closer to
the mark, a court of appeals has held that the format of a
radio station may not be altered (e.g., from classical or education
to "top forty") if such alteration would seriously deprive the com-
25 Snyder v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927,
931-32 (N.D. Il1. 1968).
2 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
27 Id.
28 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
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munity of an important medium." In such cases the courts' empha-
sis has rested most specifically and clearly upon the listener interest,
even when contrary to the broadcaster's desires.
The informational access claims of two groups have received
specific attention by the courts. Nearly thirty years ago the Supreme
Court recognized the interests of residents of company towns to
receive material from outside sources without broad censorship by
the town's owners.' Later the Court upheld similar claims of access
to shopping centers-again stressing as much the interests of per-
sons inside who wished to receive information as of persons outside
the center wishing to impart information." While the most recent
shopping center case somewhat limits the right of access defined in
the earlier decisions," the basic principle-a right to receive infor-
mation unaffected by the private status of the enclave-remains
unimpaired.
The courts have also begun to deal with access rights of prisoners
to receive even controversial materials from outside prison walls.
Although the issue has not yet reached the Supreme Court, lower
courts have insisted that prison restrictions on reading material be
narrowly drawn and may only serve the vital needs of institutional
security.' Such decisions, even more clearly than those involving
company town residents or shopping center patrons, imply a right
to receive information which can be curtailed only by specific and
substantial governmental needs.
Also closely related is the Supreme Court's holding that a per-
son may constitutionally possess obscene material in the privacy
of his own home. In Stanley v. Georgia,' the majority found it
''now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas"---a right which was "fundamental
to our free society."' Of course the case dealt only with possession
and not with acquisition; four years later, the Court refused to
extend the implications of Stanley to cover the dissemination of
9 E.g., Citizens Comm. to Preserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC,
436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"sMarsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946).
"1 Amalgamated Food Employees' Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 321-23 (1968).
"2 Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
"E.g., Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
34394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"3 Id. at 564.
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obscene materials, thus placing the doctrine more on grounds of
the privacy of the home than of freedom of expression."
We have saved until last the one decision that comes closest to
recognizing a first amendment right to read. In 1962 the California
Supreme Court struck down a ban on Henry Miller's Tropic of
Cancer.' The case had two plaintiffs--one, a bookseller who
wished to sell the book, and the other a reader who wished to buy
it. Had the bookseller been in court alone, the decision would
doubtless have come out the same way, so there may be a superfluous
quality to the reader's role. Yet the government did move to dis-
miss the reader's complaint, alleging a lack of standing to raise the
constitutional issues. The supreme court responded:
Unless [the reader] is able to find a bookseller willing to face the
possibility of criminal prosecution and the attendant ... risks, he
will be deprived of his basic constitutional right to read. Thus
declaratory relief may offer the only method for vindication of this
constitutional right."8
It is true that the reader was unnecessary to the decision. It is also
true that the case came up on a demurrer, though there is no indi-
cation the court felt its judgment limited by the procedural pos-
ture. At least in California, the right to read seems fairly well en-
trenched in the freedoms of expression and communication.
If analogies do not provide a complete answer to the constitu-
tional question with which we began, logical analysis may give
added support. The argument for recognition of a freedom to read
seems at least as compelling in the case of a publicly-supported
institution like a library as in the case of a company town, a shop-
ping center, a college campus, etc. Clearly the constitutional range
of access to information, any more than of expression, cannot be
narrower in a public place or facility than in a comparable private
entity. The Supreme Court has quite recently stressed, in holding
that municipal auditoriums could not bar the controversial musical
"Hair," the importance of public function and responsibility in
this regard.' It would be anomalous if courts were to hold that the
"1United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
3 7Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1963).
"Id. at 903, 383 P.2d at 155-56, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
"1 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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reader has less right to receive controversial material from a public
library than from a private bookstore or lending library or from a
privately-owned radio or television station. Indeed, the first amend-
ment responsibility of a tax supported library system to its patrons
would seem at least as broad as the responsibility of a company
town to its residents or a broadcast licensee to its listeners. The
public library is as integral a part of the public forum as the mu-
nicipal park or auditorium, and access to its intellectual resources
should be unfettered for similar reasons.
Before bringing this discussion to a close, one possibly trouble-
some question must be considered: Does not the existence of alter-
native channels in most communities ensure that readers will have
access to controversial materials even if the library refuses to carry
them or make them available? There are two quite dispositive
answers.
The first is that only the public library is free, and thus consti-
tutes the only channel within reach of many people. Few can
afford to buy all the books they want to read, or rent them from a
lending library--even if the range of selection were as broad in
the private sector. For many people of limited means, the public
library is the only source even for daily newspapers and weekly
magazines, and even more clearly for such costly items as hardcover
books. Thus the availability of private sector alternatives is con-
stitutionally defective because, for many citizens, it is illusory.
There is a second and better answer. The public library has cer-
tain responsibilities simply because it is public. In the recent "Hair"
case, the City of Chattanooga argued that it should not be required
to open its auditorium to an abhorrent musical because there were
plenty of other facilities in the community. Even if private theaters
would welcome a chance to present "Hair" in Chattanooga, that
would be constitutionally irrelevant: "'[O]ne is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' " What
goes for rock musicals must apply with even greater force to li-
braries: the existence of private outlets (quite apart from the cost
factor) seems constitutionally immaterial to the right of access to
information.
"I/d. at 556, quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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To this point we have talked only of the right to receive ma-
terials. The librarian's rights, of course, are derivative or corollary.
The author, printer, and publisher need not invoke the reader's
rights because they have personal first amendment rights of dis-
semination. But the librarian is not directly in the channel of dis-.
tribution and thus cannot invoke the same kind of interest. Instead,
the argument must be that the reader cannot read if there is no
material available, and that the librarian is a principal source of
such material.
The argument needs to be developed a bit more fully. First, it
seems clear that a librarian cannot be required to violate the con-
stitutional rights of readers by withholding materials to which the
first amendment ensures them access. The California Supreme
Court has held that a social worker may not be compelled to vio-
late the privacy rights of his clients by conducting unannounced
predawn raids."1 In other settings it seems clear that the public
employee may not be forced to choose between losing his job and
violating the rights of others. ' The same principle should apply
no less to the librarian faced with a threat or demand to abridge a
patron's right to read. Quite apart from the broad constitutional
principle, there is a practical risk of civil liability for depriving the
patron of his rights. Surely, then, the desire to respect the first
amendment interests of persons whom he serves should protect the
librarian against reprisal. If the right to read enjoys the constitu-
tional status we have suggested it should, the librarian is surely a
most appropriate, if indirect, beneficiary.
This constitutional claim is, however, a derivative one. The ques-
tion remains whether the librarian enjoys personal first amendment
rights. Although no court has so held, it would be surprising if
the sensitive intellectual work of the librarian could not claim con-
stitutional protection. Yet here again we must reason by analogy.
The most obvious and apposite analogy is to academic freedom.
A substantial body of case law now protects freedom of expression
and association of professors and researchers. Clearly this freedom
encompasses more than simply classroom instruction. Also included
are political activity and association off campus, participation in
41 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967).
"See generally R. O'NEIL, THE PIUCE OF DEPENDENCY 81-83 (1970).
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labor organizations, writing letters to the local press, and of course
academic relationships with students and colleagues. Over the last
twenty years or so, the courts have struck down a broad range of
invasions of academic freedom that chill free thought and inquiry
even though they do not directly stifle discussion in the classroom.'
The relevance of libraries and librarians to academic freedom
should be obvious. Professors cannot pursue controversial issues
or invite student research on the frontiers of human knowledge un-
less the university library is free to order and circulate all relevant
materials. Indeed, a free and unfettered university library may well
be the cornerstone of academic freedom. Thus the college or uni-
versity librarian is engaged in a pursuit which seems no less de-
serving of direct first amendment protection, within the academic
community, than the teaching and research of the professor.
The relevance of academic freedom to the public school or com-
munity library is less obvious. Yet the public library shares with
the university a responsibility for the gathering and transmission
of knowledge from one generation to another. Effective participa-
tion in the political process requires ready access to the shelves of
the library. Censorship of the acquisition and circulation of con-
troversial materials by the public library cannot help but constrict
the total intellectual and political environment of the community.
If librarians are not free to gather and disseminate a broad range
of materials, then the civic life of the community and the vigor of
political debate are bound to suffer. Thus the function of the public
library-and the need for constitutional protection of that function
-relate closely to the mission of the college or university from
which academic freedom springs.
There is still a missing step, however, by which to bring the
librarian's professional activity under the purview of the first
amendment. What is needed is a new concept of free expression
which would encompass the librarian's intellectual and creative
processes. Such a concept should not be difficult to fashion. In
fact, some of the librarian's functions are "speech" in the narrow-
est and most traditional sense. Yet it would hardly do to stop there
-that is, to tell the librarian that he may order any book he wishes
(because that involves "speech" in the technical sense) but that he
" See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 593-626.
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may not catalog, shelve, or circulate the work since these func-
tions are not traditionally within the first amendment. Rather than
parsing the librarian's work in this arcane fashion, we need a much
broader concept which will include all the elements vital to the
exercise of a librarian's professional judgment and responsibility.
Such an extension of the traditional concept of free expression
hardly seems radical or novel. The Supreme Court has already
recognized the concept of "symbolic speech"-notably in the case
of a student wearing a black armband in protest against the Viet-
nam war.' A lawyer's freedom of expression necessarily involves
the solicitation of clients.' An architect's "speech" must include
drawing blueprints and the designing of buildings, as well as verbal
descriptions of these works. For the sculptor and painter, the only
meaningful concept of expression includes the tangible artistic work
which results from the creative process, even though the only tradi-
tional "speech" involved may be the title or the catalog.' Most re-
cently the Supreme Court has brought within the protection of the
first amendment the performance of a rock musical, whatever
might be the Justices' views of the literary merits of the particular
work."
In this setting the professional activity of the librarian seems to
merit comparable constitutional protection. When the librarian
speaks or writes words of his own, the first amendment unmistak-
ably applies, but simply does not go far enough. Most of what the
librarian does is to review, select and disseminate the words of
others. Yet the preparation of acquisition lists, cataloging and
shelving and circulating books all require a measure of judgment
and intellectual evaluation comparable to those required of other
protected professions. Moreover, the courts have never had diffi-
culty bringing under the first amendment the bookseller, the news-
dealer or the movie exhibitor, all of whom disseminate the words
and works of others rather than their own. Surely the librarian,
who performs a similar function in a noncommercial context,
should not enjoy a lower level of constitutional protection.
4 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
46 Cf. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903
(1970).
4 7 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra note 39.
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III. ASSERTING THE LIBRARIANS' RIGHTS
The current state of affairs is anomalous. We have a plausible
basis for a new constitutional right, but no court decisions recog-
nizing it. Librarians ought to be protected, but in fact they are not.
The next critical step is to take measures which will bridge the gap
between constitutional theory and practical application. What mea-
sures might be appropriate?
The first and most obvious step is test litigation. Already under-
way in the California courts the suit challenging the "harmful to
minors" law. " The result in the first round was favorable to the li-
brarian-plaintiff's interests but on so narrow and nonconstitutional a
ground that they, along with the state, have appealed. The Califor-
nia appellate courts may well render the first clear constitutional de-
cision on the rights and liberties of librarians. Should this case fail
to produce a constitutional judgment, then undoubtedely other suits
will be brought under the auspices of the American Library Asso-
ciation. Once librarians have begun to assert their legal interests,
they are not likely to back away simply because the first suit stops
short of the constitutional issue-especially when, as in the Cali-
fornia case, the narrow decision is favorable to their position.
Litigation should not be the only approach, however. Much can
be done through legislation. Recently representatives of state library
associations have become much more active in opposing obscenity
and other censorship legislation, and in pressing for protection for
librarians. "9 (A number of states have adopted exemptions which
either expressly or by implication spare librarians from liability
for good faith circulation of obscene materials.)" If properly or-
ganized, and working together with publishers, authors and distrib-
utors groups, librarians could become a far more effective political
force for intellectual freedom than they have been to date.
The third approach lies through education. Most citizens know
far too little either about the incidence or the risks of censorship,
especially as it affects libraries. It is raids on pornographic book
stores and seizure of X-rated movies that capture the headlines-
not the slow undermining or erosion of a librarian's will or con-
" Moore v. Younger, supra note 5.
49 See, e.g., 22 NEWSLETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 7 (1974) (New York
and Pennsylvania); Wiederholt & Wood, Defending the Right to Read in Oregon,
24 id. 37 (1975).
"
0 E.g., OHio REV. CODE § 2907.31(C) (1975).
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science. Ways must be found to dramatize the plight of the beleag-
ured librarian in a repressive community. The ALA's superb News-
letter on Intellectual Freedom has begun to do this in a most effec-
tive way, but to a circulation list of 3000 (less than 10% of the
total ALA membership). The newspapers pay far too little atten-
tion to developments affecting libraries. Throughout the Kanawha
County, West Virginia school textbook crisis in the Fall and Win-
ter of 1974, little was written about the potential and actual threats
to school libraries; all the attention in the press was given to school
classrooms, school board meetings, bombings and the like. (Happi-
ly the Director of the ALA Office of Intellectual Freedom was ask-
ed by the National Education Association to serve, and did serve,
as a member of the panel investigating the West Virginia situation.)
Much more needs to be done simply to make the public aware both
of the dangers of library censorship, and of steps that can be taken
to combat such repression.
Finally, there is a need for more and better professional educa-
tion on the subject of library freedom and librarians' rights. The
simple fact is that professionals in the field often do not fight back
because they are not fully cognizant of their legal rights. Every
university that has both a law school and a library school should
offer at least one course on the legal rights of librarians (as well as
the more frequently taught legal liabilities and obligations). There
should be casebooks and other teaching materials dealing with li-
brarians' rights, and a host of paper topics for students who wish to
pursue the subject in depth. Collaboration between lawyers and
library specialists offers a most promising prospect both for teach-
ing and for research. The wonder is that such collaboration has
been so limited to date.
IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutional rights and liberties of professional librarians
seems to be a constitutional concept in search of a decision. If the
California suit does not provide the vehicle for judicial recognition
of this vital set of first amendment interests, another case will do
so before long. Meanwhile, the risks of repression and censorship--
"' See the account of the American Library Association's program to defend
intellectual freedom, in D. BERNINGHAUSEN, supra note 7, at 128-38.
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the stifling of a major artery of free inquiry and public debate-
cannot be minimized simply because adequate precedent is lack-
ing. If the problem exists, and surely it does, the courts will get to
it soon enough.
